INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this book is to present a mathematical theory of the class of machines known as Perceptrons. The theory is carefully formulated and focuses on the theoretical capabilities and limitations of these machines.
It is a remarkable book. Not only do the authors formulate a new and fundamental conceptual framework, but they also fill in the details using strikingly ingenious mathematical techniques. They ask some novel questions and find some difficult answers. The most striking of these will be presented in Section 2.
The authors address the book to three classes of readers:
(1) Computer scientists, specializing in pattern recognition, learning machines, and threshold logic;
(2) Abstract mathematicians interested in the d6but of Computational Geometry;
(3) Those interested in a general theory of computation leading to decisions based on the weight of partial evidence. The authors hope that this class includes psychologists and biologists.
In Section 6 I shall give my estimate of the value of the book to each of these groups.
The conversational style and the childlike freehand sketches might mislead the casual reader into believing that this book makes light reading. For example, the review in The American Mathematical Monthly (1969) states that the prospective reader "requires little mathematics beyond the high BLOCK school level." This, as we shall see, is somewhat sanguine. Another extreme opinion is due to Allen Newell (1969) who begins his review in Science with the statement "This is a great book.", and then proceeds to present in detail his reasons for this extraordinary judgement. My evaluation is somewhat more moderate. It is presented in Sections 5 and 6.
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NEW THEORY
In the interest of brevity we will not provide any of the proofs or introduce those concepts whose r61e is primarily technical. The reader who tries to provide his own proofs will, I believe, soon come to appreciate the mathematical virtuosity of the authors. We start with some definitions.
Let the plane rectangular region {0 ~ x ~ M, 0 ~ y ~ N} be divided into squares s~j ={i~<x~iq-1, j~<y ~j-~l; i = 0,1,..., M --1, j = 0, 1,..., N-1}. The set of all these squares is called 1 the retina, R. Thus R is a finite set of squares {sit }. A subset X of R is called an image (or pattern, or figure) in R. The number of squares (sometimes called points)
in X is denoted by ] X[.
A predicate P is a function of images, taking on the value "true" or "false." That is, P(X) is a statement about the subset X which is either true or false.
The authors introduce the helpful "partial bracket" notation r 7, where for any statement P, rp7 = 1 if P is true, rp7 = 0 if P is false. We now identify "1" with "true," and "0" with "false." Thus if P is a predicate so is rp7. This "partial bracket" is often convenient for typographically displaying predicates.
The support of a predicate P is the intersection of all subsets S of R which satisfy the condition: P(X) -~ P(X n S) for all subsets X of R. In intuitive terms, the support of P is the set of squares that P "depends on." The support of P is denoted by S(P). Thus I S(P)I is the number of squares in the support of P.
For a given family of predicates *I, = {4}, we say that a predicate ~b is a linear threshold function with respect to • if there is a number/9 and, for each in ~, a number a(4), such that ~b has the representation ¢(x) = E 4(x) > 1 For simplicity and clarity of exposition in this review, I have slightly altered Minsky and Papert's definition, which initially takes R to be an arbitrary finite set of points. The special setting we use here will be more suitable for our exposition and involves no real loss in generality.
for all subsets X of R. The class of all predicates which are linear threshold functions with respect to • is denoted by L(O). A perceptron is defined, by the authors, as a device capable of computing all the predicates in L(cI,) for some family cI,. In Sections 5 and 6 we discuss the relation of perceptrons so defined to the Perceptrons introduced by F. Rosenblatt.
The order of a predicate ~b is the least number k for which there exists a set of predicates cl, = {~} such that ~b ~L(cI,) and ] S(~)[ ~ h for all q~ in 4. (Note that the number of predicates in • does not enter into the definition of order. This will be discussed in Section 6.)
We can now state two theorems.
THEOREM. The "parity predicate" r I X I is odd ~ has order I R [. We need a few more definitions. A transformation g on R is a one-to-one mapping of R onto itself. A transformation g induces, in a natural way, the set function g(X) = Os~xg(s). With the product of transformations defined in the usual way (gh(s) = g(h(s))), a set of transformations closed under product and inverse is a group of transformations. Translations are handled by the agreement that any part of a figure that is carried over the right boundary of the retina is brought back in at the corresponding place at the left, and vice versa. Similarly, parts carried over the top re-enter at the bottom and vice versa. That is, after a figure in R has been translated, the X and Y coordinates of its points are reduced to their residues modulo M and N, respectively. Thus, the retina is wrapped onto a torus, where the translations become a finite transformation group. If the figures and the translations are "small" relative to the retina, it is expected that the "local structure" of the toroidal retina will be in close agreement with that of the plane retina.
Given a group G ----= {g} of transformations, a predicate ~b is invariant under G if ~b(g(X)) ~ ~b(X) for every g in G and every subset X of R. A group G is transitive if for every pair (s, t) in R × R there is a g in G such that g(s) = t.
THEOREM. The "counting predicates" r] X I < M 7 and r[ X I > M q (where M is some number) are of order one. These are the only first-order predicates invariant under a transitive group.
Most of the predicates we shall meet, e.g., rX is a convex set 7, rx is a connected set 7, rX has a hole 7, etc., can be described without explicit reference to the size and shape of the retina R. If a predicate is of order ~k, regardless of the size and shape of the retina, then we say that the predicate is of finite order. (To be perfectly rigorous we should say that we have a class of retinas R = {R} and a class of predicates, one for each R. If the orders of all these predicates are bounded, then the class is of finite order. Since no confusion is likely to arise, the simpler locution is used.) For example, it follows from the theorems cited above that the parity predicate and the one-in-a-box predicate are not of finite order. The counting predicate is of finite order, in fact of order one.
The logical operators @, --~, ^, v are defined by
rp v Q7 =rp7
(1 -rQ~) + (1 -rp~) rQ~,
+ rQ~ _ rp7 rQ~. here however we allow corner connectionsL Note that it is assumed that the figure is surrounded by an "outside" that does not count as a hole.
2 It seems that this difficulty could be avoided by using hexagons instead of squares for the tessellation of the plane. Some of the theory would have to be checked to verify that no difficulties are thereby introduced. A somewhat similar theory, but with some differences, is obtained if one replaces the order limitation of a predicate by a diameter limitation. That is, instead of the number of points in S(6) in the definition of order, we use the diameter of the set S(~). The authors find that diameter-limited perceptrons can recognize the predicates rx = R ~, r I X I> M 7, rX is a triangle ~, rx is a rectangle 7, rx is a particular figure X0 7, but cannot recognize the predicate rM 1 < [X[ < M~ 7 (which is second-order), or the infinite-order predicate rx is connected 7 ; also, that the only nontrivial topological properties that can be recognized by a diameter-limited perceptron are the Eulerian predicates rE(X) > M 7, rE(X) < M 7.
Let the Euler number E(X)

SUMMARY OF THE BOOK
The book begins with Chapter 0, Introduction. Here Minsky and Papert present a clear, crisp, and masterful summary of the book as a whole. In addition they offer, in their ebullient style, their opinions and sentiments on the past, present, and future of Perceptrons.
Chapters 1-10 develop the new theory, the highlights of which we gave in Section 2, above.
Chapter 11 treats learning machines and gives several proofs of the wellknown convergence theorem for perceptrons with error correction. Considerably more novel is the proof of the Boundedness Theorem in the nonseparable case. This theorem can be stated as follows: Efron (1964) , but it was rather difficult to follow and was never published in a standard journal. The literature has therefore lacked a clear and rigorous proof. Minsky and Papert's penetrating analysis goes a long way towards providing one. (But see the remark in Section 4, below).
Chapter 12 contains a general discussion of linear separation, learning, and heuristics. Also included are estimates of the storage capacity and computing time required by a variety of algorithms, such as maximum likelihood, isodata, template matching, and nearest neighbor. Layered machines, Samuel's checker player, neuronal models, hash coding, and incremental methods are briefly discussed.
In the final chapter, 13, the authors expound their general views on perceptrons and pattern recognition. They also recount the development of their ideas on the subject. The book ends with Bibliographic Notes, in which the authors comment briefly on some of the well-known papers in this field.
DETAILED NOTES FOR THE PROSPECTIVE CAREFUL READER OF THE BOOK
This section of the review is directed to those who will read the book carefully and is intended to help them over misprints, lacunae, ellipses, etc. Notation: An asterisk following the number of a line denotes that number of lines from the bottom of the page.
Page 26, line 14", (i.e., 14 from bottom) for that read than. Page 26, lines 5*, 6*, change many predicates to every predicate. Page 31, line 9*, add except for the mask of the empty set, which has order ~ero.
Page 32, line 3*, the inequality should read 0 < M <IR I, for the result is not true if M = 0 or M = I R [. The predicate then is, in fact, of order one.
Page 43, line 1, mentions the "group of all rotations about all points in the plane". This is not a group, since the product of two equal but opposite rotations about two distinct points is not a rotation about a point in the plane, Let P(X) denote the predicate rX is connected or X contains a hole n.
Then the assertion on the bottom of page 85 that "P(X) is of finite order," seems to be incorrect. Apparently the authors felt that the assertion followed from page 89, line 10, where it is shown that the predicate rE(X) = M 7 is of finite order. But these are not the same predicates for any value of M.
Even though (E(X) = 1) implies (P(X) is true), the converse does not hold. In fact Theorem 5.9 (page 92), stating that "The only [nontrivial HDB] topologically invariant predicates of finite order, are functions of the Euler number E(X)" contradicts the assertion. For we have E(X) = 2 if X has two components and no holes, or if X has three components and one hole.
But in the first case P(X) is false, while in the second P(X) is true. Thus
P(X) is not a function of E(X).
It might seem more natural to define a topological transformation as a one-to-one mapping (like the other transformations) which preserves adjacency and, perhaps, the "outsideness"; and to say that a predicate ~b is topologically invariant if it is invariant under topological transformations. Then however Theorem 5.9 (cited just above) would no longer be true, because, e.g., the counting predicate r I X 1 < M 7 is of order one and is invariant under any group of one-to-one transformations, but clearly it is not a function of the Euler number. Thus the authors have a reason for choosing their definitions as they do, but it would seem more natural for topological invariance to be less restrictive than invariance under the full permutation group, which allows discontinuities and tearing. This suggests the following question, which is not treated in the book. Which (one-to-one) transformations of a finite toroidal grid preserve adjacency and outsideness ? Clearly we have the translations, reflections in horizontal or vertical lines or through a center, products of the preceding, and, for square grids, rotations through multiples of 90 °. Are there any others ? How can the whole class be characterized ?
In the last nine lines of p. 98 the authors discuss the "tolerance difficulties" (caused by the finite mesh size) when one tries to deal with rotations other than multiples of 90 ° or with affine contractions. However, their definition of convexity "(a ~ X and b e X) implies (midpoint [a, b] E X)" (p. 103) ignores this difficulty. Moreover, they are using "lattice points" as the points in R, in which case the midpoint of two lattice points is not always another lattice point. One can partially get round this difficulty by using closed squares, as we have, and defining a set X as convex if every line segment joining the centers of two squares in X has its midpoint in X. Another definition is that there exists a convex subset of the plane which meets each square in X and no others; a detailed study can be found in Sklansky (1970) or Montanari (I 970). Minsky and Papert again discuss the tolerance difficulties on page 134, lines 5-19, and examine convexity further in Section 9.3.
Page 108, line 9, replace orders by sizes of the supports. . ¢context The authors do admit to some doubts about their definition of a "predicate in context", but these doubts do not inhibit them from using their definition as the basis for some rather strong statements on page 112 (lines 3-11) and page 113 (last 10 lines).
On page 118, line 10", the authors take B~ = d + 1 and then make the The definition on page 137, line 10, "We choose xi. to be the boundary point to one's right when standing on xi and facing the complement of X,"
is ambiguous if, as in the figure (top of page 138), the figure has parts that are only one square thick. The dotted lines in Figure 9 .1 confused me; they do not seem to agree with the algorithm in the text. Page 144, line 12, change 2 m to 2 '~-1 -t-1, and modify subsequent estimates. Page 151, line 22, change 3~3 to 3~2 • In a book dedicated to mathematically precise exposition, it is something of a shock to meet the statement (page 160, lines 9*-7*): "Probably this means that Theorem 10.4.1 is not strictly true, but we do not think the exceptions are important."
In Chapter 10, Minsky and Papert show that extremely large weights are required for certain predicates. It should be noted that the weights could be reduced if additional layers were used. The proof of the Convergence Theorem (pages 164-175) seems excessively labored. The briefest proof, based on one by W. C. Ridgeway, is only a few lines long and may be found in Block and Levin (1970) .
Page 175, lines 12-14, insert a minus sign on the right side of the displayed equation.
Page 175, line 17", the phrase "after a finite number of transfers" is incorrect. In fact it is easy to see that for c < 1, a solution is never reached, since after each step, A • ¢ is still negative. The algorithm of Kameda (1967) , which converges rapidly to a minimal length solution, deserves to be cited here.
The proof of the Boundedness Theorem (pages 182-187) is, as has been mentioned above, a welcome addition to the theory, filling a long-standing need. The presentation in the text is somewhat disorganized and unclear. There is one serious flaw, where the authors draw the inference "... so that II C tl < M~-I ;" (page 187, line 17), apparently based on the inequality [I B1 + C II < I1 B1 II + M~-I. This hiatus can be repaired, but it is not trivial. The reader will find in Block and Levin (1970) a dearer proof, which is based on the ideas introduced by Minsky and Papert in this section of the book.
In the discussion of the Bayes procedure (page 193, lines 3"-1", and in Section 12.4.2) there appears to be some confusion regarding the relationship between (a) the hypothesis that the ¢'s are statistically independent, and (b) the linearity of the discriminant function. The following elementary derivation will, I believe, clarify the situation.
BAYESIAN DECISION PROCEDURE, STATISTICAL INDEPENDENCE, AND LINEAR DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS
Consider K urns labeled 1, 2,..., K. Each urn contains a collection of patterns {X}e. (It may happen that the same pattern occurs in more than one urn.) The contents of each urn are known. One urn is chosen at random but its label is not revealed. From that urn a pattern X is chosen and revealed. From which urn did it come ?
We must decide on a number k from the set (1, 2,..., K), knowing that a certain pattern X has been chosen. There are three well-known approaches.
The maximum likelihood method decides on the k which maximizes P(X [ k),
the probability that pattern X is drawn, under the hypothesis that urn k was selected.
The maximum a posteriori method decides on the k which maximizes the conditional probability of k, given that Xis observed: P(k [ X) = [P(X [ k) P(k)/P(X)];
or, equivalently, the k which maximizes P(X ] k) P(k). In the special case in which the a priori probabilities P(k) are equal, method (2) reduces to method (1) 3. Assume that a loss A(k [ j) is suffered if we decide on urn k when in fact j was the urn form which X came. If, when we observe X, we decide on urn k, then the
expected loss is L(k ] X) = E, h(k l j) P(J I X) = Ej A(k I J) [P(X ] j) P(j)/P(X)]. The minimal expected loss method, or the Bayes Procedure, decides on the k which minimizes L(k I X) (or, equivalently, E~ 2(k ]j) P(X I j) P(j)).
If A(k [j) = 1 --~ then method (3) reduces to method (2); also L(klX) is then the probability of an error if k is decided on when X is observed.
In general then, having observed X, we choose k so as to minimize
For each subset S of R let Cs be the predicate Cs(X) = rx ~ S n. Then 
g(k l X) = ~ A(k l J)P(J)I~ P(~, = x, lJ).
If A(h [j) = 1 --3k~ then we can take logarithms and choose k so as to maximize
which is a linear discriminant function in the one-point predicates xi • The analysis in Minsky and Papert follows from the above, if we consider their ~'s as if they were x2s in a second level. The assumption of independence can often be validated in practice by suitably randomizing the retinal connections, as Rosenblatt did.
On pages 194-199, the nearest-neighbor method is discussed. The authors would have done well to cite the elegant results of T. Cover (1967b) , showing the effectiveness of this method.
Page 205, line 2", a factor p~ should be inserted on the right side of the equation.
The figure on page 206 is somewhat misleading; it should be noted that the input to I-[J is I~i (Pij/qiJ) ¢i"
In Section 12.6 reference should be made to the remarkable finding of T. Cover (1967a) that, for a large number of patterns in general position, the number of patterns that can be separated is approximately twice the number of adjustable weights.
Page 244, line 19, refers to Theorem 11.6. There doesn't seem to be any theorem with this number. What is probably intended is the Theorem in Section 11.9. Similarly on line 23, the reference to Section 11.6 should probably read Section 11.10. Page 248, line 15", change proceduce to procedure.
On page 248 (lines 6*-4*) it is stated that "the [perceptron convergence] theorem would have been instantly obvious had the cyberneticists interested in perceptrons known about Agmon's work." Since there is nothing in "Agmon's work" (1954) about termination of the process after a finite number of steps, this aspect of the theorem at least does not seem to be "instantly obvious". Furthermore, it is not clear who "the cyberneticists" are; but presumably the authors do not include themselves in this category. One might wonder why the rebuke does not apply to all those interested in the perceptron, e.g., Papert (1961) , or Minsky and Selfridge (1961) , rather than just to "the cyberneticists". In this connection one may also wonder about the remark on page 4 (lines 5*-3*): "We feel, in fact, that the solemn experts who most complained about the 'exaggerated claims' of the cybernetic enthusiasts were, in the balance, much more in the wrong." Are the authors to be counted among the "solemn experts"? (cf. Minsky (1961)).
COMPARISON WITH ROSENBLATT'S PERCEPTRONS
Let us compare the perceptrons studied in this book with the Perceptrons introduced by F. Rosenblatt (1957) and cross coupling. Let us take a few moments to explain why this is so. By 1930 it had become generally accepted that the mind resides in the brain and the brain is packed with neurons. The threshold response of neurons and their electrochemical pulses were also known, as was the general nature of the synapses. Scientists therefore began to look forward to an explanation of brain functions, such as memory, perception, or reasoning, in terms of brain structures, such as neurons, synapses, and thresholds. The classic paper of McCulloch and Pitts (1943) showed that all logical functions could be effected by simple mathematical abstractions of neurons. (Incidentally, Kleene (1956) , in clarifying the results of McCulloch and Pitts, introduced the connection between "regular expressions" and "finite-state machines," thus initiating an important part of the field of computer science; but these developments turned away from the problem of brain modelling.) There followed a good deal of discussion on "neuroeconomics": If the neurons in the brain were of this simple type, would there be enough of them to account for brain functions ? It was also asked whether the specific configurations used by McCulloch and Pitts actually occur in the brain. The answer to both questions appeared to be negative, or at least not encouraging for brain models of this type. A model proposed by Hebb (1949) , using reverberating cell assemblies, appeared to overcome some of these difficulties; but Hebb's model was vague in many details.
One purpose of Rosenblatt's Perceptrons was to define the Hebb model more precisely, so that its performance could be analyzed mathematically. One of the crucial features of Rosenblatt's machines was the provision for change in the neural net as the result of its activity. Only by including a mechanism for change in the net can one hope to achieve a model for memory and learning. The analysis of complicated networks of this type appeared to be very difficult. In order to see if a form of learning occurs, even in the most primitive case, the simple Perceptron was studied first, and for it the "Perceptron convergence theorem" was proved. This was encouraging, not because the simple Perceptron is itself a reasonable brain model (which it certainly is not; no existing Perceptron can even begin to compete with a mouse!), but because it showed that adaptive neural nets, in their simplest forms, could, in principle, improve. This suggested that more complicated networks might exhibit more interesting behavior. Minsky and Papert view the r61e of the simple Perceptron differently: p. 247 (lines 15-17) "... a key part of the process leading to the convergence theorem was the molding of the concept of the machine to the appropriate form." Thus, what the Perceptronists took to be a temporary handhold, Minsky and Papert interpret as the final structure.
Another difference seems to stem from a venerable misunderstanding as to why Rosenblatt used randomized connections. Switching theorists look for some particular virtue in this arrangment. Finding none, they condemn the system as inefficient. Except for certain small blessings of independence mentioned earlier (at the end of the passage in Section 4 on "Bayesian Decision Procedures,...") there is no particular virtue in randomization. This is precisely the reason it is used! If a randomized net can learn, then certainly so can a net with carefully specified connections. The postulation of a highly specific connection scheme obliges the modeller to find such a network in the brain. He would also have to face such problems as explaining how functions of damaged parts of the brain are taken over by other parts; or how one learns to see with inverting eyeglasses. So in the sense of a "worst case" or "minimal constraint" feasibility study, one randomizes the connections. This approach goes back at least to Craik (1943) :
"Models of the brain-on the pattern of a telephone exchange-would be much more convincing if they did not postulate any particular connections. Such constancy of connections is very unlikely in view of individual variations in micro-anatomy.
"It is possible that a brain consisting of randomly connected impressionable synapses would assume the required degree of orderliness as a result of experience, just as a randomly connected telephone exchange might become usable if any pair of people could lower the resistance of their line and so get into audible communication, if they tried often enough."
It also appears in McCulloch (1951): "...[Von Neumann] has to be very careful to specify in detail which relays are to be connected to a given relay to trip it. That is not the case in human brains. Wiener has calculated that the maximum amount of information our chromosomes can convey would fill one volume of the Encyclopedia Britannica, which could specify all the connections of ten thousand neurons if that was all it had to do. As we have 10 l° neurons, we can inherit only the general scheme of the structure of our brains. The rest must be left to chance. Chance includes experience which engenders learning. Ramon y Cajal suggested that learning was the growing of new connections."
The idea is also implicit in Ashby's (1956) "Law of Requisite Variety," where the valuable configurations would become strengthened and useless ones atrophied.
In recent days, even the autonomic nervous system has been suspected of learning [Miller (1969) , DiCara (1970) ]. This belief has been held for some time in the East.
In some Perceptrons, does use specific-connection models, patterned after the arrangements found by Hubel and Wiesel (1959) in the cat and Lettvin et al. (1959) in the frog. These do perform better, but in a certain sense evade the deeper problem of the mechanism of learning.
One may conceive models in two fundamentally different ways. Given several competing theories, models may be employed to decide which theory is closest to the observed facts. On the other hand, given an observed function, one might seek to construct a model which, without regard to accuracy in detail, exhibits that function. The latter was Rosenblatt's approach. Since there exists no model which even remotely imitates brain function, Rosenblatt's aim was to devise some model, of no greater complexity than biological neurons, which might be capable of approximating at least some elementary brain functions; cf. Block (1962): "...Admittedly the model represents an enormous simplification of even the known brain structure; but if it does not violate the biological constraints (such as the number of units, the organization of connections, the reliability of components, the mechanism of signal transmission, the speed of response, the stability of the performance with respect to component malfunction or extirpation, the capacity for information storage, etc.) and if it exhibits even rudimentary brain functions, then, even if it does not in fact operate in the same manner as the brain does, it still provides at least a possible explanation of how the brain structure, as we know it at this time, might be organized to perform these functions."
The opposite view of the r61e of models can be seen in Minsky and Papert p. 211, line 17: "Thus the simple anatomy, combined with the membrane becoming permeable briefly following a nerve impulse, could give a quantity that is an estimator of the appropriate probability.
"How could this representation of probability be translated into a useful neuronal mechanism ? One could image all sorts of schemes: ionic concentrations--or rather, their logarithms!--could become membrane potentials, or conductivities, or even probabilities of occurrences of other chemical events. The 'anatomy' and 'physiology' of our model could easily be modified to obtain likelihood ratios. Indeed, it is so easy to imagine variants--the idea is so insensitive to details [my italics--HDB]--that we don't propose it seriously, except as a family of simple yet intriguing models that a neural theorist should know about." "Insensitivity to details" is a fault in the eyes of someone trying to decide which among several theories is true; but it is a virtue to someone trying to find some model, not inconsistent with the known facts, that will function in a specific way. Both approaches are, of course, legitimate, but a lack of understanding of the differing perspectives of the parties can lead to much fruitless debate.
To exhibit the difference in still another way: Suppose that we randomly scrambled 10 l° mathematical neurons, furnished inputs, specified reinforcement rules, and observed outputs. Suppose further that we then found that the mass functioned like a brain; perceiving, thinking, remembering, deciding, guessing, controlling purposeful behavior, etc. This might be very exciting; but it really wouldn't prove anything about how any actual brain works. It is incorrect in all details; it is too complicated to analyze; it can't tell us anything about the function of the hippocampus, or where memories are stored or how they are called up. It does suggest how a brain might be organized, but has nothing to contribute to the question of how any living brain is in fact organized. A Perceptron is not a description of a brain; it is rather a direction and a hope.
Work on the four-layer Perceptrons has been difficult; but the results suggest that such systems may be rich in behavioral possibilities, once the mathematical tools become available to analyze them [cf. Rosenblatt (1960 Rosenblatt ( ), (1964 , Block, Knight, and Rosenblatt (1962) , Konheim (1963) ]. Even more suggestive are the multilayer machines with feedback (the C-systems and F-systems of Rosenblatt (1967) ). The models studied extensively by Grossberg (1967 Grossberg ( -1969 , although differing from the Perceptron in several respects (continuous variables, instead of discrete; linear, instead of a step-thresholding function, etc.) are nevertheless much closer to the spirit of Rosenblatt's Perceptron than is the book under review. The same can be said of other brain models, such as those of Kabrisky (1966) or Baron (1970a Baron ( ), (1970b Papert's book are two patterns; one is connected, one is not. It is virtually impossible to determine by visual examination which is which). Rosenblatt would be content to begin to approach human capabilities, and in fact would tend to regard unfavorably a machine which went beyond them, since it is human perception he is trying to approximate. Recognition of commonly occurring shapes, familiar faces, partially obscured objects, the detection of significant features, etc., would seem to provide more relevant tests than parity or connectedness. Rosenblatt's approach would call for quantitative studies of more natural recognition problems. While Minsky and Papert enumerate at length the difficulties that such predicates as parity and connectedness cause for their perceptrons, they neglect to mention the remarkable ability of Perceptrons to continue to function reliably even after many of their components have been destroyed. This capability is inherent in the organization of Perceptrons and does not require special arrangements. "Reliability of the system in spite of malfunction of the components" is important to the Rosenblatt viewpoint because it is common in biological systems but rare in computers, where the malfunction of a single element generally results in a nonsensical output.
Thus, although the authors state (p. 4, lines 12-14) "we have agreed to use the name 'perceptron' in recognition of the pioneer work of Frank Rosenblatt.", they study a severely limited class of machines from a viewpoint quite alien to Rosenblatt's. As a result, the title of the book, although generous in intent, is seriously misleading to the naive reader who wants to find out something about the general class of Perceptrons.
In summary then, Minsky and Papert use the word perceptron to denote 643/I7/5-7 BLOCK a restricted subset of the general class of Perceptrons. They show that these simple machines are limited in their capabilities. This approach is reminiscent of the m6hel who throws the baby into the furnace, hands the father the foreskin and says, "Here it is; but it will never amount to much."
CONCLUSIONS
We might address the following comments to the three classes of readers for whom Minsky and Papert have intended their book.
1. Specialists in "pattern recognition" who are interested in the practical recognition of visual patterns by computers will find the book of limited value. Such readers might more usefully consult the books of Kolers and Eden (1968) , Rosenfeld (1969) , Grasselli (1970) , Cheng et al. (1970 ), or Uhr (1966 . Although some of Minsky and Papert's theorems might prove useful, there seem to be more promising avenues to practical pattern recognition; as Minsky and Papert indicate, one might be Guzman's (1968) ; others would be Alan Shaw's (1969 Shaw's ( ), (1970 , and David Noton's (1969 Noton's ( ), (1970 .
"Learning Machine" enthusiasts will find, unfortunately for their purposes, that most of the book concerns fixed networks. However, the chapters on "learning machines" are sprinkled with provocative comments, which many readers may find stimulating and instructive. Specialists in "threshold logic" may find the mathematical techniques useful Unless they are concerned with visual pattern recognition however, they may find much of the theory to be outside their domain of interest.
2. I had thought that abstract mathematicians might find intriguing the idea of a computational geometry. Those with whom I have tried to discuss the subject were not captivated. They objected to the concept of order as not taking into account the number of predicates used. Thus, for example, they felt that convexity, although of order three, involved so many predicates that it really should be of infinite order. In the same way, they felt that the And-Or Theorem, far from revealing a deep fact about the nature of geometry, was merely the consequence of a poor choice of the basic definitions. If a relation as primitive (and as easy to implement technically) as "and" or "or" can, when it operates on two first-order predicates, produce a predicate of infinite order, then some doubt is cast on the appropriateness of "order" as a measure of complexity. Also, it is easy to prove that there exists a set of predicates cI, ~ {¢}, each having only one point of support, such that any predicate ~b eL (L(O) ). Does this mean that with two layers, all predicates are of order one ? If not, how does one define order for mukilayer machines ? It seems that there should be a trade-off between logical depth (number of layers) and complexity in a given layer. This basic relationship still remains to be formulated and explored.
I don't take too seriously these criticisms offered by pure mathematicians, recalling the reception accorded Heaviside and Dirac; but the notion of Computational Geometry did stir up a lot of apathy.
3. For psychologists and biologists, the level of mathematical maturity demanded will, I believe, make the book somewhat difficult to read. Moreover, since the types of neural nets that Minsky and Papert study are very restricted, it seems unlikely that theorems about their limitations can be of much relevance to psychologists or biologists. It is like demonstrating to a surgeon that if he wears boxing gloves he cannot possibly operate effectively.
The absence of Exercises or Problems might limit the usefulness of the book as a classroom text.
As to future research in the new theory: I would expect that the charisma of the authors will attract many able young workers. I would also expect that any results which have eluded the mathematical inventiveness of Minsky and Papert will turn out to be very difficuk indeed to establish. One has the impression that if there were anything further of interest in this direction, Minsky and Papert would probably have found it! Thus, one would expect that the next phase of this research will turn toward more elaborate systems: models having several layers, heirarchical organization, feature detectors, feedback, etc.
In sum then, Minsky and Papert's formulation of their theory of perceptrons is precise and elegant. Their mathematical analysis is brilliant. Their exposition is lively, often bombastic, and, occasionally, snide (p. 242, lines 14"-11", "We were pleased and encouraged by the enthusiastic reception by many colleagues at the A.M.S. meeting and no less so by the doleful reception of a similar presentation at a Bionics meeting."). Two questions remain:
Will the new subject of "Computational Geometry" grow into an active field of mathematics; or will it peter out in a miscellany of dead ends ?
Will the formulations or methods developed in the book have a serious influence on future research in pattern recognition, threshold logic, psychology, or biology; or will this book prove to be only a monument to the mathematical virtuosity of Minsky and Papert ? We shall have to wait for a few years to find out.
